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Internet ofThings (IoT) is a key business driver for the upcoming fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks, which in turn will enable
numerous innovative IoT applications such as smart city, mobile health, and other massive IoT use cases being defined in 5G
standards. To truly unlock the hidden value of such mission-critical IoT applications in a large scale in the 5G era, advanced self-
protection capabilities are entailed in 5G-based Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) networks to efficiently fight off cyber-attacks such as
widespread Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. However, insufficient research has been conducted in this crucial area, in
particular, few if any solutions are capable of dealing with the multiple encapsulated 5G traffic for IoT security management. This
paper proposes and prototypes a new security framework to achieve the highly desirable self-organizing networking capabilities
to secure virtualized, multitenant 5G-based IoT traffic through an autonomic control loop featured with efficient 5G-aware traffic
filtering. Empirical results have validated the design and implementation and demonstrated the efficiency of the proposed system,
which is capable of processing thousands of 5G-aware traffic filtering rules and thus enables timely protection against large-scale
attacks.
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) applications are widely envisioned
as a major use case in the forthcoming fifth-generation (5G)
mobile networks and would account for one-quarter of the
global 41 million 5G connections in 2024 [1]. Meanwhile,
security is a top concern for large-scale IoT deployment,
which is subject to new, disparate kind of threats and attacks.
The constrained nature of IoT devices in terms of memory,
computation, and power, as well as the unattended, pervasive
and dynamic network environment, makes them appealing
to attackers. Diverse types of evolved cyber-attacks, for
instance,DistributedDenial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which
rely on infected bots, are starting to appear in IoT [2, 3].
For example, the Mirai attack in 2016 took down major
websites via massive DDoS using hundreds of thousands
of compromised IoT devices [4]. Low-Power Wide-Area
Network (LPWAN) protocols employed in IoT scenarios,
such as NB-IoT [5] defined in 3GPP 13 release [6], are not
ideal environments to perpetrate DDoS based on high-rate
brute force attacks, due to their associated lowbit rate (60kpps
uplink). Nonetheless, variants of DDoS attacks, based on
low-rate methods [7], fit perfectly in these environments,
since they exploit techniques such as sending partial HTTP
requests, sending small packets, or keeping sessions open
from going to idle time-out.
Similarly, some other kinds of attacks, e.g., those based
on unauthorized access, or data leakage, are difficult to
detect and mitigate. Infected IoT devices might disclose
private personal data of their owners, such as localization,
owner identity data, or even video from their featured video
cameras. Unfortunately, security and privacy mechanisms are
difficult to enforce in the final device, and therefore, the
network infrastructure should be ready to self-protect the
whole network and system, without involving necessarily the
potential malicious IoT device.
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Thus, in order to counter dynamically and on demand
those cyber-threats in a 5G-enabled IoTnetwork, the network
operator might need to filter, mirror, divert, and differentiate
IoT packets in the edge access network and in the core of
the 5G network. Ideally, this traffic control and management
should be performed accordingly at any packet encapsula-
tion level required in LTE/5G Networks. This may include
multiencapsulation required to support user mobility and
carrier-isolation, any field of the inner packet headers, the
tenant the IoT device is associated with, or even any field
of a particular IoT-specific protocol, e.g., the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) [8], used by the affected IoT
device, among others.
Network operators should be able to offer advanced
Security-as-a-Service solutions, exploiting the flexibility pro-
vided by Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) to detect dynamically cyber-
threats, and react accordingly, enforcing proper and timely
countermeasures, either at the core or at the edge of the
network, including dynamic enforcing of pertinent filtering
rules to dropmalicious traffic coming from themyriad of IoT
devices.
The increasing number of technologies using network
virtualization, where traffic is usually encapsulated to sup-
port multicarrier 5G-enabled services, raises the challenge
of managing encapsulated traffic efficiently. Like in LTE
and 5G, NB-IoT traffic might require to cope with smart
objects mobility, which involves dealing with another level of
encapsulation, e.g., through the General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTP).
In a basic network environment, and using predefined
matching filters like Linux Netfilter, each packet will traverse
all the filtering rules until matching a rule. That will cover
layer-3 and layer-4 headers and also application layer pay-
load, when l7-filter is used. Indeed, diverse researches on
functional enhancements for efficient traffic filtering have
already been provided in the state of the art [9–12]. However,
there is still a lack of filtering mechanisms able to perform
traffic filtering in multicarrier and mobility scenarios for IoT
traffic, being able to deal with the encapsulation requirements
imposed by both edge and core network segments of the 5G
multitenant networks, capable of performing traffic filtering
and deep packet inspection in NB-IoT traffic. Moreover,
there is a lack of security frameworks that can assist the
security management in order to provide self-healing and
self-repairing capabilities to the NB-IoT networks, adapting
dynamically the network traffic filtering to the current con-
textual conditions.
Our proposed filtering mechanism in this paper allows
inspecting and analyzing traffic without having to create any
tunnel interfaces to deencapsulate the traffic. It allows filter-
ing beyond the first encapsulated layer and dealing with any
packet and header of any inner encapsulated traffic to cope
with mobility and multitenancy requirements of virtualized
5Gnetworks.Thefiltering predicates allow classifying packets
in Linux kernel space based on any packet fields in any
header and encapsulated packet. The benefits are manifold,
encompassing scalability, performance, and flexibility, since
there is no need to create tunnel interface to perform the
deencapsulation, and traffic filtering in kernel space provides
an efficient approach.
Moreover, the proposed filtering mechanism has been
integrated into a security framework to achieve resilience and
autonomic reconfiguration of the filtering rules in order to
counter cyber-attacks as low-rate DDoS.
The contributions of this paper are manifold:
(i) A new security framework is presented with an
autonomic control loop to enable self-organizing
networking based self-protection.
(ii) This paper focuses on an encapsulation-aware traffic
filtering approach especially devised for virtualized,
multicarrier, narrowband, and 5G-aware IoT net-
works.
(iii) A prototype of a deep packet inspection method is
presented, using a kernel space mechanism in order
to have full control of encapsulated traffic required in
virtualized NB-IoT networks.
(iv) The filtering mechanism has been integrated in the
autonomic and security management architecture
devised in a joint collaboration between two EU
H2020 projects: Anastacia (in IoT security) [13]
(H2020 Anastacia: http://anastacia-h2020.eu/) and
SELFNET (in 5G management) [14] (H2020 SELF-
NET: https://selfnet-5g.eu/).
(v) Empirical performance evaluation of the proposed
system is presented and analyzed, over a realistic 5G-
compliant virtualized NB-IoT network infrastruc-
ture.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we analyze the background on filtering techniques as well
as scientific related work in the research field. Section 3
introduces NB-IoT leveraged in virtualized 5G architectures
and laid out filtering requirements for multicarrier and vir-
tualized 5G-enabled NB-IoT networks. Section 4 overviews
themanagement framework. Implementation and testbed are
presented in Section 7. Section 8 reports the experimental
results in terms of efficiency, suitability, and scalability. Con-
clusions and future research activities are drawn in Section 9.
2. Background and Related Work
Despite the considerable number of related work in the area
of IoT security, there is still no solution from the 5G data
path perspective, where the novel technological advancement
of this new paradigm enforces to have mechanisms able to
deal with nested encapsulation. Furthermore, as explained in
the previous Section 1, the 5G PPP working group also high-
lights the capability of self-adapting the whole network in a
dynamic way as one of their main features. Thus, providing
a dynamic management and reconfiguration of the system
is a feature that very few studies have taken it into account,
and even fewer have studied a framework with an automatic
control loop for organizing security policies. References [15–
17] are the only studies in this state of the art where a
5G nested encapsulation has been achieved by using ker-
nel filtering techniques, programmable hardware interfaces,
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Table 1: RelatedWorks.
Work
Dynamic
Management
and Reconfig-
uration.
Cognitive
Management
Framework
5G RAN and
Edge-Core
Implementation
Setup
Classical
IP
Support
5G
Multi-
tenant
Support
5G
Mobility
Support
Application
Layer
Support
IoT
Support
VNF
Solution
Scalable
Approach
[20] ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[37] ✓ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙ ∙
[16] ✓ ∙ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙ ∙
[17] ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙ ∙
[21] ∙ ∙ ∙ ✓ ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ✓
[19] ✓ ✓ ∙ ✓ ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙
[38] ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙
[18] ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ✓ ✓ ∙ ✓ ∙
[15] ✓ ∙ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ∙ ∙ ∙
Our con-
tribution ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
and an extended Intrusion Detection System (IDS) version,
respectively. However, those studies are far away from the
IoT perspective and no cognitive management framework
has been presented. Other studies, such as [18], have used
decapsulation and reencapsulation techniques for filtering
inner layers of the traffic produced by LTE and 5G networks.
Nevertheless, that approach removes the device mobility sup-
port through the infrastructure, although mobility support
is indispensable for 5G mobile networks. The work in [19] is
one of those infrequent studies about security in IoT where a
framework using Software-DefinedNetworking for confining
traffic flows of devices is presented. However, although
this work implements automated techniques for identifying
vulnerable devices and isolating them from the rest of the
users devices by generating OpenFlow enforcement rules
(OF-rule), it does not have the 5G capability for dealing
with multitenant and mobile-device traffic. For reducing
both capital and operational expenditure from the point of
view of the operators, next-generation mobile networks are
adopting softwarization and virtualization technologies. In
this way, deployment and service creation becomes flexible
and agile. This feature becomes extremely important when
the aim is to provide a scalable approach. In [20] authors
present a 5Gplatform for IoT applications, and the platform is
able for deploying Virtualized Multiaccess Edge Computing
(vMEC) when required. In [21], a hierarchical IoT structure
is set up by using several cluster heads that can handle
several sensor nodes. A cluster head is assumed to have
more computational power and energy resources than a node.
In such a case, a sensor node transmits traffic data to the
corresponding cluster head at first, and then the cluster head
forwards the data to the central server. From Table 1, none
of the related work presented has managed to accomplish
multitenant support, mobility support, IoT support, appli-
cation layer filtering, and a dynamic management based on
an autonomic framework at the same time. None of them
has considered nested encapsulation to be able to create
security IoT filtering rules in the edge/core of the network.
To the best of our knowledge, this contribution is the first
one to be able to provide these capabilities simultaneously
and to deploy fine-grained actions for dealing with this kind
of complex attacks in the edge/core of a 5G network due
to the advanced transversal filtering capabilities supported.
In conventional network scenarios, IDSs are often used to
evaluate the trustworthiness of network nodes and identify
malicious IoT nodes by monitoring their traffic or behavior
[22, 23]. Once malicious traffic is detected, several filtering
techniques can be used for acting as a firewall.
2.1. Filtering Techniques. The complexity of the nature of
the 5G networks requires a deep packet inspection (DPI)
for going further into the packet structure. DPI allows an
application to look into the data payload when packets
are passing an inspection point. Therefore, a noncompliant
protocol, viruses, spam, or another kind of useful information
in the payload can be found and then it is decidedwhether the
packet should pass or not or should be routed to a different
destination. In order to acquire a signature that represents
a specific network application, tools and techniques have
relied on simple mechanisms that basically compare the
content of the packet payload with a set of strings [24–
26]. Later, DPI techniques replaced string sets with regular
expressions for fasting packet inspection processing [27,
28]. A comprehensive literature review and comparison
on the tools and techniques necessary to develop modern
DPI systems is presented in [29]. Additional research work
has studied the efficiency of traffic filtering and proposed
new functional enhancements over traditional firewalls. The
work in [9] applies statistics collected from policy segments
with the aim of setting up Huffman trees that dynami-
cally adapt to the traffic statistics and ultimately improve
the average filtering time. Other techniques rely on early
packet rejection to enhance the performance such as the
one proposed by [10]. It can be deployed on top of any
filtering mechanism to prefilter unwanted expensive traffic.
Some other work such as [11] perform reordering of rules
and rules fields based on the calculation of the histograms
of packet matching rules. In [12], a splay tree firewall is
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proposed to handle packet rejection and acceptance and
can perform splay filters reordering based on a statistical
model that utilizes traffic characteristic. Open vSwitch (OVS)
(Open vSwitch, http://www.openvswitch.org) is a software
switch responsible for providing network connectivity to
virtual machines. Since it is programmable, it brings the
possibility of applying filtering rules by using standard pro-
tocols such as OpenFlow (Specification of Open Networking
Foundation cite [30]) and therefore achieving a separation of
the data plane from the control plane. As a drawback, OVS
only supports a limited number of protocols. Although every
new release of this software adds support for new fields or
protocols, each version requires changes throughout and con-
sequently a new building, distributing, and installing process
is needed. That is the reason why new approaches such as the
one presented in [31] and Tu William et al. [32] have a goal
to reduce compatibility problems between different kernel
versions and OVS versions and provide support for new pro-
tocols without recompiling. To this end, a high-level language
for programming protocol-independent packet processing
such as P4 (P4 Language Consortium, https://p4.org/) is pro-
posed and OVS datapath is implemented entirely using
the Enhanced Berkeley Filter (eBPF) for decoupling OVS
datapath functionalities from kernel versions. Therefore, by
using a compiler that accepts P4 and emits eBPF, generation
of new fields/protocols without imposing the necessity to
change the OVS version would be feasible. Another filtering
approach is to employ byte-matching techniques. In order
to allow dynamic inspection of message payloads, a new
Netfilter matching extension called u32 was added by Don
Cohen [33]. u32 allows jumping between headers and select
a specific range of bytes to be inspected. The u32 match
feature instructs the module to extract 32 bits (4 bytes)
from the packet at any specified location and compares it
with a given value. If the field that needs to be extracted is
fewer than 32 bits, the extracted data is masked and shifted.
Additionally, it also includes a technique to calculate variable
header lengths to overcome the problem of dynamic size
headers in protocols such as IP or TCP. As a drawback,
u32 just allows no more than 100 characters per predicate,
which is a high limitation when dealing with encapsulated
traffic where a significant number of headers are added to
the protocol stacks. Similarly, the BSD Packet Filter (BPF)
[34] is a byte-matching filtering mechanism that provides
an efficient way of filtering packets in the kernel space. BPF
is available on most Unix operating systems and it provides
a similar functionality to the u32 module but without its
filtering size restrictions. BPF is also available by using the
user-space program called iptables which allows configuring
Linux kernel firewall implemented within the Netfilter [35].
Iptables uses a set of tables to inspect, modify, forward,
redirect, and/or drop packets.Themain functions of Netfilter
are associated with each one of those tables. Despite the
advances in the related work, the existing tools are not able to
deal with traffic filtering in virtualized 5G Networks, where
traffic from different tenants (multicarriers/operators) needs
to be encapsulated to differentiate their users, and mobility
scenarios impose another level of encapsulation to be handled
in the firewall. The filtering management solution proposed
in this paper enables handling dynamically 5Gnetwork traffic
according to the decisions made by the autonomic security
framework, and it is based on BPF as the underlying filtering
mechanism to handle efficientlyNB-IoT traffic in 5G-enabled
networks. It is important to highlight that although BPF is
a well-known mechanism, the way how it is used in this
publication stresses its capabilities for dealing with the most
complex packet structure that it can be seen over the new 5G
mobile network infrastructures.
3. NB-IoT Networks in Virtualized and
Multitenant 5G Deployments
3.1. NB-IoT Preliminaries. The 3GPP, in release 13 [6, 36],
has specified a new cellular radio access interface called
Narrowband Internet ofThings (NB-IoT), which is optimized
for machine type traffic. The specification tries to be as
simple as possible to minimize energy consumption, which
is crucial for IoT scenarios, considering also difficulties in
radio conditions present in these ecosystems. NB-IoT has
tight relationships with LTE specification. Indeed it has been
integrated into the LTE standard, and therefore, it can be
also integrated with virtualized and multitenant 5G-aware
architectures as it will be shown in the next section.
The NB-IoT specification minimizes the radio overhead,
and it is able to deliver IP and non-IP data. As it can be
seen in Figure 1, NB-IoT introduces two new optimizations
over the traditional LTE network for the cellular Internet of
Things (CIoT), namely, the user plane CIoT (continuous lines
in the figure) and the control plane CIoT (dotted lines in the
figure). The control plane adds the new IoT-specific Service
Capability Exposure Function (SCEF) to deliver non-IP data
over the control plane and provides an abstract interface for
the network services such as authentication, Access Control
or discovery. To allow this, the Mobility Management Entity
existing in traditional LTE to deal with user mobility is
extended with the new T6a interface to allow the non-IP
IoT traffic to be forwarded. The user plane CIoT allows
forwarding of data traffic as in traditional LTE, through the
Serving Gateway (SGW) and PDN Gateway (PGW).
NB-IoT technology uses licensed band within the fre-
quency band of 180 kHz, adopting one resource block (either
in guard-band or in-band) of LTE transmissions. It allows
up to 30/60 (DL/UL) Kbps maximum user rate. NB-IoT
lacks handover support in the connected state, and only
cell reselection in the idle state is supported. It is intended
to provide network connectivity to Cat-M1 devices, which
send a small amount of data and are not sensitive to delays.
Therefore, it does not support QoS directly. The devices
are supposed to be active for a while and then go idle
using Power Saving Mode (PSM) in order to save battery. It
supportsAccess Stratum (AS) optimization calledRRCwhich
allows reducing to the minimum the signalling needed to
suspend/resume user plane connection.
3.2. NB-IoT Integration in Virtualized 5G Architectures.
Figure 2 depicted the envisaged NB-IoT functional architec-
ture integrated into the upcoming 5G 3GPP releases. Due to
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Figure 1: NB-IoT general functional architecture.
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Figure 2: Envisaged NB-IoT functional architecture in upcoming 5G 3GPP releases.
the novel nature of the proposed 5G architecture, the figure
shows in parenthesis the relationship between the novel 5G
architectural components and the existing LTE components.
It has been tailored based on the analysis of all the on-going
standardization efforts coming from NB-IoT, 5G RAN, 5G
architecture, and a natural way to join them together.
It is also worth mentioning that 5G proposes a fine-
grain functional separation of the required functionality of
the 5G infrastructure and the usage of Commercial-off-the-
Shelf computers, rather than specialized hardware in order
to minimize capital and operational costs. The envisioned
architecture is composed of the following architectural com-
ponents:
(i) Distributed Unit (DU) and Centralized Unit (DU)
are the architectural components of the Radio Access
Network (RAN) and they present an analogy in terms
of functionality to the existing LTE RRH (Remote
Radio Head) and Base Band Unit (BBU), respectively.
5G proposes a functional segregation of the RAN,
fostering the dynamic separation of layers in the RAN
stack. It is achieved through the deployment of the
protocols of the stack in two architectural compo-
nents DU and CU, according to the requirements
of the deployment and the use case addressed. It is
noted that CIoT indicates support for the radio access
interface of the NB-IoT specifications.
(ii) Access and Mobility Function (AMF) provides User
Equipment (UE) authentication, authorization, and
mobility management.
(iii) Session Management Function (SMF) is in charge
of managing sessions and allocates IP addresses to
UEs. It is also responsible for selecting and manning
the User Plane Forwarding Function (UPF) for data
transfer.
(iv) Authentication Server Function (AUSF) stores data
for the authentication of UE.
(v) User data Management (UDM) stores data about the
subscription of UE.
(vi) User Plane Forwarding (UPF) is the mobility anchor
for the UEmobility and is in charge of forwarding the
UE traffic back and forward to the Internet.
(vii) Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF) deliv-
ers non-IP data over the control plane and provides
an abstract interface for the network services such as
authentication, Access Control, or discovery.
Another key aspect of 5G architecture is the softwariza-
tion and the usage of multitenancy shared resources in
6 Security and Communication Networks
a secure way, fostering the reduction of both capital and
operational costs. However, this mobility and multitenancy
support for different carriers and telecommunication opera-
tors in the network imposes new requirements in the network
traffic filtering and it has been the main motivation of this
contribution.
It is noted that a comprehensive explanation of all the 5G
architectural elements and its reference points is provided in
[39].
3.2.1. Network Traffic Filtering Requirements in 5G-Enabled
IoT Networks. There are a number of specific requirements
for network traffic filtering in 5G IoT networks, listed as
follows:
(i) Multitenant support: in 5G architectures, the net-
work functional blocks are virtualized as VNFs and
different network operators, carriers, and verticals
can share the physical infrastructure. The packets
need to be encapsulated (e.g., in VXLAN) to differ-
entiate the traffic among them, for management and
security reasons. The filtering system needs to deal
with this encapsulation.
(ii) Mobility support: LTE and 5G networks are subject
to the mobility of the UE and, in this case, the
mobility of the IoT devices. Although in NB-IoT
handover is not supported in a connected stage, cell
reselection is supported in the idle state. Mobility
in 5G architectures means that packets need to be
encapsulated towards themobility anchor component
(UPF in 5G), e.g., using the GTP protocol. The traffic
filter will need to be able to handle directly these
encapsulation headers.
(iii) Application layer filtering: the network traffic fil-
tering system should allow filtering packets for any
header/field of any protocol of the OSI stack, includ-
ing IoT application layer protocols such as CoAP [8].
(iv) Scalability: despite that NB-IoT is a Low-Power
Wide-Area Network (LPWAN) protocol that requires
lowbit data rate, theCIoT-RANand the core of the 5G
network will need to cope with the packets of massive
IoT devices. Therefore, the network filter(s) will need
to efficiently manage the packet filtering process for
numerous devices.
(v) Dynamic management: IoT networks are volatile
and traffic is subject to changing security condi-
tions. Therefore, the management framework needs
to automatically adapt the security filtering policies,
by enforcing and decommissioning dynamically the
rules according to the actual context obtained from
real-time monitoring. This dynamic and intelligent
management requires relying on softwarized network
management and Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) technologies for handling such adaptation.
(vi) Uplink/downlink differentiation: 5G architectures
require having two different Tunnel Endpoint Identi-
fiers (TEIDs) per user, which needs to be handled by
the management framework and the filtering agent.
(vii) Nested encapsulation: the filtering agent needs to
support nested encapsulation for handling simultane-
ously the traffic encapsulation for both mobility and
multitenancy.
4. Cognitive NB-IoT Management Framework
The proposed architecture relies on SDN and NFV technolo-
gies, monitoring and reaction tools, cognitive components
as well as diverse security enablers and agents to ensure
self-protection, self-healing, and self-repairing capabilities
in IoT networks and systems. It follows a policy-based
security management approach to provide interoperability
and higher flexibility to manage security controls over het-
erogeneous networks, including 5G-compliant IoT networks.
The required security actions can be enforced either directly
in physical IoT networks or virtual and softwarized appli-
ances. Figure 3 shows the proposed security management
architecture.
The Admin Plane features pertinent APIs, tools, and
graphical interfaces to support administrators on specifying
high-level intents about security policies. The policy edi-
tor allocated in the plane provides a user-friendly tool to
configure security policies using a high-level security policy
language, to govern the configuration of the system and
network, including not only network traffic filtering but also
authentication, authorization, channel protection, and traffic
management actions.
The security orchestration plane is in charge of deploy-
ing and enforcing the security policies on policy-aware
security enablers and components, providing a run-time
reconfiguration and adaptation of security enablers, whereby
the framework is endowed with dynamism and intelligence
required for self-healing and self-repairing capabilities. The
orchestrator provides autonomic adaptation according to the
decisions received from the reaction component.
The Policy Interpreter module plays a key role in the
refinement of security policies. The high-level policies are
first translated into a medium-level security policy language,
which allows specifying work-flows related to security proce-
dures in a technology-agnostic way. Then, these policies are
refined in specific low-level configurations according to the
selected enablers. The policy refinement process is detailed
in our previous paper [40].
Themonitoring component gathers real-time information
including security reports, regarding the underlyingmanaged
infrastructure, both physical and virtualized. It aims to alert
the reaction module when something is malfunctioning.
Security probes such as IDS and flow and resource mon-
itoring probes are deployed into the SDN, NFV, and IoT
infrastructure domain to give feedback to the monitoring
services.
Then, the reaction component is in charge of providing
appropriate countermeasures, according to the systemmodel
status and monitoring information from the monitoring
component. It features a cognitive engine in charge of
providing intelligence to the management framework, e.g., by
selecting adaptation policies or intents stored in the relevant
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Figure 3: Network management architecture for 5G-enabled IoT networks.
repository and by requiring reconfiguration of the security
enablers to cope with the detected attack/threat.
The Security Orchestrator supervises the orchestration
of the security enablers to be deployed into the Security
Enforcement Plane (to be introduced), according to the
policy requirements. In addition, at run-time, it analyzes the
reaction outcomes and orchestrates the corresponding coun-
termeasures. In this manner, the overall framework aims to
achieve self-healing and resilience capabilities, by constantly
ensuring the satisfaction of the security requirements defined
in the end-user policies.
The Security Enforcement Plane is split into three main
domains. The control and management domain supervises
the use of resources and run-time operations of security
enablers deployed over software-based and IoTnetworks.The
SDN controllers are in charge of communicating with the
SDN-enabled network elements to manage connectivity in
the underneath virtual and physical infrastructure. In this
sense, the Network Policy Enforcer is in charge of connecting
through a southbound API with the Agents deployed in
the network, e.g., to enforce filtering rules with a particular
filtering agent or a virtual firewall (vFirewall). The Orches-
trator is NFV ETSI MANO-compliant to provide support
for the secure placement and management of virtual security
functions over the virtualized infrastructure. In addition,
different IoT controllers are used to managing IoT devices
and low-power and lossy networks LoWPANs and LPWANs.
These IoT controllers can be deployed at the edge of the
network to deploy and enforce Network Security Functions
(NSFs) in IoT domains.
The Infrastructure and Virtualization Infrastructure
domain encompasses both physical machines in charge of
holding and supporting storage, computing and networking
infrastructure, and the virtualization technologies, to provide
Infrastructures as a Service (IaaS). This domain comprises
the network elements needed for traffic management (e.g.,
forwarding, divert, routing etc.), according to the SDN
controller rules, as well as the security probes for data
gathering needed by the monitoring services.
The VNF domain refers to the virtualization infrastruc-
ture that holds VNFs deployed to enforce the 5G network
functional blocks as well as any Virtual Network Security
Function (vNSF) to be deployed by the orchestration plane,
such as virtual firewall, vIDS/IPS, vChannelProtection, etc.
It is able to provide the defense mechanisms and threat
countermeasures requested by security policies.
IoT domain comprises the NB-IoT network (including
the CIoT-RAN) as well as the IoT devices to be controlled.
This encompasses security enablers, software agents, and
actuators required to enforce the security instructions com-
manded by the orchestration plane. Namely, the filtering
agent is deployed in the CIoT-RAN in order to control the
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Figure 4: NB-IoT filtering scenario in virtualized and multitenant 5G Infrastructure.
traffic between the particular NB-IoT network according to
the filtering rules received dynamically by the Network Policy
Enforcer.
5. Virtualized and Multitenant
NB-IoT Infrastructure
This section describes an experimental deployment based
on a virtualized NB-IoT LTE infrastructure that is deployed
in our labs, with several 5G features already supported.
For simplicity, Figure 4 provides a simplified view of our
deployed infrastructure, where the management plane is
omitted. Our infrastructure is composed of 10 computers
with an Ubuntu 16.04 and an OpenStack Mitaka release.
The deployment employs Neutron and OpenDayLight as
SDN controller running the NetVirt Neutron northbound
interface provided by OpenDayLight. OpenDayLight utilizes
OpenFlow and OVSDB to control the Open vSwitch v2.9
software used to control the data path of the virtual machines.
In the figure, only one edge and one core PCs are shown for
simplicity, althoughour lab has two edge nodes and eight core
nodes. Every one of the boxes labeled as operator X represents
a tenant administrative domain. Each of the tenants has
deployed a complete set of VNFs to run the 5G network.
To carry out the deployment of the VNFs, the Mosaic5G
(http://mosaic-5g.io/) (evolution of the OpenAirInterface
project) infrastructure has been deployed in each of the ten-
ants of the infrastructure. The current version of Mosaic5G
allows functional disaggregation of DU and CU although still
using the 4G spectrum. Moreover, for the core, the current
release still uses MME, HSS, and SGW/PGW terminology;
however, it is fully virtualized and running in VNFs. This
scenario allows us to have a realistic infrastructure to explore
and analyze the NB-IoT traffic along all the network seg-
ments.
It is noted that the switches labeled with A in Figure 4
represent the control points used in OpenStack in order to
enforce tenant isolation bymean of VLAN,Virtual eXtensible
Local Area (VXLAN), or GRE encapsulation. The different
points in the data path labeled with B in Figure 4 represent
the NB-IoT data plane (using IP connectivity) where GTP
encapsulation is present to handle mobility in the devices.
Packets flowing across the infrastructure shown in
Figure 4 can be encapsulated into different encapsulation
protocols depending on the network segment. The points
in the data path labeled with C are a subset of the points
labeled with B representing the more complex encapsulation
segment for the NB-IoT infrastructure and, at the same
time, one of the most efficient ones to apply filtering policies
due to the closeness to the hardware (running in physical
machines rather than in VNFs). It is especially important
when traffic coming from very dense deployments, with
potentially hundreds of thousands of NB-IoT devices, need
to be handled.
6. Traffic Filtering Process Design
6.1. Filtering Process. The network traffic filtering process
is accomplished according to the steps depicted in the
architectural Figure 3. The steps are detailed below:
(1) Firstly, in step (1) of Figure 3, the administrator
defines proactively his security policy intents, e.g.,
the filtering policies, employing an interoperable
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language, such as MSPL considered in the EU H2020
ANASTACIA project.
(2) Those interoperable policies are refined and
translated—step (2)—into particular low-level
configurations according to the format required by
the specific filtering agent deployed in the network,
such as the one shown in our previous work in the
context of the Anastasia project [40] or the one in
our previous work in the context of the SELFNET
project [15].
(3) The Security Orchestrator is notified of the deploy-
ment of the rules. Optionally, it might contact the
NFV Mano—step (3.1)—to deploy (if not deployed
yet) as a VNF the filtering agent acting as a vFirewall,
either in the CIoT-RAN or in the core of the network.
Then, in step (3.2) it contacts either the SDN Con-
troller or the Network Policy Enforcer to enforce the
filtering rules through the northbound API.
(4) The Network Policy Enforcer contacts the filtering
agent using a southbound API, e.g., Netconf, in
step (4) to enforce the filtering rules. The proposed
filtering mechanism is able to deploy the rules in
Filtering Agents deployed either in the CIoT-RAN or
in vFirewall deployed in the VNF domain of the core
of the virtualized 5G Network.
(5) Afterwards, once in run-time, the monitoring agent
starts providing monitoring information through
probes to the monitoring module, step (5). In this
regard, this monitoring traffic is sent through the
Pub/Sub Broker.
(6) In case the monitoring module detects an attack
based on configured signatures, step (6), it warns the
reaction module to make a decision accordingly, and
this notification is done using IODEF or IDEMEF
standards.
(7) The reaction module component, based on its rule
engine, makes a decision to take a proper counter-
measure tomitigate the attack, step (7). Itmight imply
adding, for instance, new filtering rules to drop, or
divert the traffic coming fromaparticular infected bot
IoT device that is performing a low-rate DDoS attack.
This reaction outcome can be done either using a
standard such as OpenC2 or by means of tailored
mechanisms, as proposed in our proposal in the next
section.
(8) The Security Orchestrator contacts again the Network
Policy Enforcer to self-reconfigure dynamically the
network by deploying the pertinent reaction filtering
rules using the northbound protocol, as shown in step
(8).
(9) Finally, the filtering rules are configured in the fil-
tering agent through the southbound API, step (9).
These rules will consider the network traffic filtering
requirements in Section 3.2.1 to copewith theNB-IoT
traffic, including nested encapsulation for mobility
and multitenant traffic filtering support.
6.2. Pattern Matching Filtering Mechanism. This subsection
describes in detail the steps indicated in the previous sub-
section related to the enforcing on the filtering rules into the
managed elements.
Our network filtering mechanism is based on BPF [34]
to enforce the filtering rules. This filtering mechanism is an
efficient way of filtering packets in the kernel space and it
is being used today in hardware networking equipment and
even in virtual networking software such as OVS, employed
mainly to overcome the limitations of OpenFlow regarding
packet classification.
Indeed, BPF is used in many management utilities such
as tcpdump, libpcap, iptables, ebtables, etc. BPF is in fact
not only a language to express filtering policies using a user-
friendly high-level descriptive language, but also a built-in
compiler (and optimizer) that translates from the high-level
BPF program into compiled BPF x86 bytecode.
Therefore, BPF allows system administrators to select and
control packets using high-level packet filtering expressions.
The following illustrates an example of filter expression using
a tcpdump style syntax which will be compiled in a BPF
program later on.
$ iptables -m bpf --bytecode $ (nbpf compile
’proto[Start:End] & Mask = Value’) $
The mechanisms used in this paper is based on this
approach but using a match with more complex matching
rules where the complexity of the frames crossing the
infrastructure is taken into account, as described in the next
subsection.
6.3. Hierarchical Encapsulation. Figure 5 illustrates an exam-
ple of the most complex hierarchical encapsulation available
in the NB-IoT multitenant 5G infrastructure, corresponding
to the capture of packets in the control points labeled as C in
Figure 4.
The first group of headers is related to the communica-
tion between physical machines including Medium Access
Control (MAC), IP and UDP headers. The second group of
headers includes a VXLAN, MAC, IP, and UDP, inserted
to isolate tenant traffic, especially for a telecommunication
operator sharing the same physical 5G infrastructure as a
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Figure 6: CoAP message format [8].
tenant. This paper proposes to employ the VXLAN protocol
to achieve that tenant isolation as an example but other
alternative protocols can be used for the same purpose. The
next group of headers including GTP, IP, UDP, Application
(APP) HEADER, and APP PAYLOAD is used to allow NB-
IoT device mobility. GTP is the tunneling protocol employed
in NB-IoT and 5G infrastructures to establish the data path
for IoT devices with features such as mobility, admission
control, etc. Finally, the application header and payload
represent the data being sent/received by the devices.
It is noted that a normal IP network uses a very limited
subset of these headers, for instance, MAC/IP/UDP /APP-
HEADER/APP-PAYLOAD. Compared with that simple case,
several additional headers have been added to achieve both
multitenancy and mobility of NB-IoT devices.
6.4. Filtering Rules for IoT Traffic in 5G-Aware NB-IoT Net-
works. In addition to the network protocols specified in the
previous section, an application protocol is also considered
for filtering, since different network attacks are not identi-
fiable unless the traffic filter matches particular fields at the
application layer. In this sense, nowadays, the prominent IoT
application protocol is CoAP [8]. It is a lightweight protocol
that follows a REST model especially devised for constrained
IoT devices (cat-M1) required in NB-IoT. Figure 6 shows the
packet structure of the CoAP protocol [8].
7. Implementation and Validation
7.1. Implementing Filtering Rules in Kernel Space. The pro-
posed implementation has been carried out by a filtering
agent prototyped in Python using Pika as a library to expose
a northbound interfaces receiving intents using the AMPQ
protocol [41]. An intent defines what type of traffic should be
controlled and the action that needs to be enforced over such
traffic. This approach fits perfectly into the novel cognitive
NB-IoT Management framework presented in Section 4,
and in this way the security orchestration plane is able to
deploy and enforce the network security policies, providing
a run-time reconfiguration and adaptation. It is important
to highlight that old common techniques have been using
static sets of filtering policies on a specific rule-based system
(e.g., OVS). This work adds dynamicity in terms of creating
newfiltering rules on demand and using a rule-based filtering
system that can be included as a plug-in in the filtering
agent. The same intent message will be used as input in the
northbound interface of the filtering agent regardless of the
Network
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Intent to high
level BPF
syntax Plug-in
netlink
xt_bpf compiler
iptables
module
Kernel
Hooking
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Figure 7: Filtering agent architecture.
plug-in required, thereby using a common way of deploying
filtering rules in different filtering systems.
As an example, let us assume that the filtering agent is
deployed in both points labeled with C in Figure 4 and that
the traffic needs to be dropped in order to mitigate low-
rate DDoS attacks. The intent for this example under such
assumptions is depicted in Figure 7.
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Table 2: Encapsulation groups, purpose, and interested fields to be matched.
GROUP PURPOSE PROTOCOLS FIELDS TO BEMATCHED
GROUP 1 PHYSICALCOMMUNICATION
IP
SOURCE IP ADDRESS
DESTINATION IP ADDRESS
PROTOCOL
UDP SOURCE PORTDESTINATION PORT
GROUP 2 TENANT ISOLATION
VXLAN
MAC
IP
VNID
MAC SOURCE ADDRESS
MACDESTINATION
ADDRESS
TYPE
SOURCE IP ADDRESS
DESTINATION IP ADDRESS
PROTOCOL
UDP SOURCE PORT
DESTINATION PORT
GROUP 3 DEVICE MOBILITY
GTP TUNNEL IDENTIFIER
IP
SOURCE IP ADDRESS
DESTINATION IP ADDRESS
PROTOCOL
UDP SOURCE PORT
DESTINATION PORT
GROUP 4 NB-IoT APPLICATION COAP
CODE
VERSION
MESSAGE ID
The Filter Agent is able to add/update/delete intents
coming from the Network Policy Enforcer component of the
architecture presented in Section 4. The filtering agent will
receive intents and then select among all the possible plug-
ins registered as interface providers, in order to transform
the intent in an implementable and an executable rule.
Several plug-ins are supported; for prototyping purposes,
this research work has employed a filtering plug-in based
on the Linux kernel space using BPF rules. This plug-in
converts intents into high-level BPF syntax. An example of
a high-level BPF rule is also shown in Figure 7. Then, the
high-level BPF syntax is sent to the iptables module named
xt bpf compiler. This module compiles the high-level BFP
syntax into executable bytecode in the kernel space. This
executable bytecode is associated with a hooking point into
the Linux networking subsystem (NetFilter) by using the
netlink API, so that when packets transverse such hooking
point, the bytecode is executed. An example of the compiled
BPF bytecode is shown in Figure 7.
7.2. Distributed and Scalable Virtual Firewalls. NB-IoT net-
works are expected to deal with up to 52,500 devices per cell
[6], meaning that, even with low-rate packets per second, the
filtering systemwill need to scale up properly to handle a huge
amount of packets in the mobile backhaul. In the worst case
there could be a filtering rule per device; however, with cur-
rent software-based filtering implementations it is not feasible
to handle such large quantities of rules and massive traffic in
just one firewall.Moreover, this is further complicated in light
of the complex rules defined herein that require inspecting
the packets according to multiencapsulation imposed in 5G-
based NB-IoT networks.
Our solution benefits from leveraging NFV and cloud-
computing technologies to deploy dynamically in the RAN
backhaul, on demand, virtual Network Security Functions
(vNSFs), in the format of distributed vFirewalls. Each vFire-
wall is in charge of dealing with a subset of the rules according
to a network segmentation addressed in a particular RAN.
A first filtering agent acts as a load balancer redirecting
the traffic quickly to the pertinent vFirewall responsible for
handling a subset of rules. The network segmentation and
forwarding in the load balancer can be achieved with just
one rule per deployed subsequent vFirewall, inspecting the
inner IP packet of the encapsulated traffic. Alternatively, this
can be done per tenant, by looking into the VXLAN header.
This scalable approach enables the deployment of additional
vFirewalls according to the network conditions, while our
cognitive management framework allows the autonomous
configuration of the rules for those vFirewalls.
7.3. Experiment Design. Table 2 provides an example of the
different headers explained in Section 6.3 together with all
fields that will be matched in our experiments per each
of the headers. It is noted that CoAP has been used as
the layer 7 protocol as the prominent protocol in NB-IoT
deployments.
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Table 3: Selected fields of the tests carried out using different Infrastructures.
PROTOCOL FIELDS BITS TEST 1 TEST 2 TEST 3
IP
src ip 32 ✓ ✓ ✓
GROUP 1
dst ip 32 ✓ ✓
protocol 8 ✓
UDP src port 16 ✓ ✓ ✓
dst port 16 ✓ ✓
TOTAL SIZE: 48 96 104
VXLAN vni 24 ✓ ✓ ✓
GROUP 2
MAC
src mac 48 ✓ ✓ ✓
dst mac 48 ✓ ✓
type 16 ✓
IP
src ip 32 ✓ ✓ ✓
dst ip 32 ✓ ✓
protocol 8 ✓
UDP src port 16 ✓ ✓ ✓
dst port 16 ✓ ✓
TOTAL SIZE: 168 312 344
GTP teid 32 ✓ ✓ ✓
GROUP 3
IP
src ip 16 ✓ ✓ ✓
dst ip 16 ✓ ✓
protocol 8 ✓
UDP src port 16 ✓ ✓ ✓
dst port 16 ✓ ✓
TOTAL SIZE: 232 408 448
CoAP
code 8 ✓ ✓ ✓
GROUP 4version 2 ✓ ✓
message id 16 ✓
TOTAL SIZE: 256 418 474
Three different tests have been designed in order to stress
the complexity of the filtering rules and analyze how this
complexity affects the scalability in NB-IoT deployments.
Each of the tests is related to the number of fields that are
matched on each of the protocols available in the payload
being filtered. The tests are defined as follows:
(1) Test 1 evaluates rules with predicates for matching up
to one field per protocol.
(2) Test 2 evaluates rules with predicates for matching up
to two fields per protocol where possible.
(3) Test 3 evaluates rules with predicates for matching up
to three fields per protocol where possible.
These three different tests can be applied to different
infrastructures. Firstly, these tests can be applied over a
classical IP-based infrastructure in order to have a reference
point in terms of performance and to be able to evaluable the
overhead and complexity imposed by the infrastructure. It
will require the use of only the Group 1 of headers (associated
with physical communication) indicated in Table 2. Secondly,
the tests can also be applied over aMultitenant Infrastructure
to evaluate the overhead related to tenant isolation and user-
filtering in such an environment. It will require the usage of
the Group 1 and Group 2 of headers (associated with physical
communication and tenant isolation) indicated in Table 2.
Thirdly, the tests can be further applied over an NB-IoT
Multitenant Infrastructure where both tenant isolation and
NB-IoTmobility need to be handled. It will require the usage
of the Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3 of headers (associated
with physical communication, tenant isolation, and device
mobility) indicated in Table 2. Finally, the tests can also be
applied over a Service-aware NB-IoTMultitenant Infrastruc-
ture, where not only tenant isolation and NB-IoT mobility
need to be handled, but also application-specific filtering
for NB-IoT protocols are required. It imposes headers from
Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, and Group 4 (associated with
physical communication, tenant isolation, device mobility,
and NB-IoT Application), as indicated in Table 2.
Table 3 illustrates the combination of the selected fields
of the matching rules, grouped according to the protocols
available in the three infrastructures analyzed in the three
tests carried out in each of these infrastructures. The table
contains the size in bytes that need to be matched by the
rules for each of the groups. It allows the reader to analyze
the increasing complexity of each test compared with the
previous one. It is noted that these sizes are cumulative since
the usage of Group 2 headers implies the usage of the header
of Group 1 and so on and so forth.
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The set of experiments indicated in Table 3 aims to vali-
date the feasibility of the proposed traffic filtering mechanism
to handle the traffic coming from thousands of NB-IoT
devices in the core of a multitenant 5G-network simulating
a low-rate DDoS attack that might send packets every 30s to
keep connection/sessions open to collapse the target service.
To this end, each of the experiment ranges exponentially
(power 2) the number of filtering rules being loaded from
(1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192,
16384, and 32768) according to the packets per seconds that
arrive to the filtering agent. In the worst case in terms of
scalability, the administratorwould need themost finest grain
of details in the control of the traffic and thus considering
one rule per each of the services being running in each
of the NB-IoT devices of the infrastructure. Usually, one
NB-IoT device hosts one service. Therefore, a 1:1 match
correspondence between the number of filtering rules and
devices can be assumed in the experiments. In summary, four
different infrastructures are analyzed against three different
complexities in the rules, and each of these scenarios will
be ranged against the different number of rules previously
described.
7.4. Hardware Infrastructure. The deployment presented in
Figure 4 matches the deployment carried out in our premises
with some assumptions. Firstly, one operator has been
deployed in our infrastructure and one CU and DU pair
is currently deployed. Second, two LTE-based sensors have
been simultaneously connected to our testbed in order to
reproduce a packet trace in the data path, completely accurate
to the NB-IoT devices. This has been required since our
LTE stack based on 5G OpenAirInterface currently does not
provide support for the NB-IoT radio interface. However, the
main limitations as indicated in the previous sections are in
the radio access side and those assumptions do not affect
the quality of the results presented herein since the packet
encapsulation stack being evaluated is equivalent. The com-
plete infrastructure has been deployed in OpenStack Mitaka
to allow tenant isolation. This deployment has allowed us to
gather Packet Captures (PCAP) files of the communication
between the IoT device and the SGW and PCAPs of the four
different infrastructures presented in the testbed section.
After the PCAP files have been gathered for one device,
they have been processed in order to generate derivate PCAP
files where there are as many flows as devices analyzed in the
scenario. As mentioned, there is a 1:1 match between devices,
flows, and rules. Then, these files are used in the experiments
associated with the same number of rules/devices.
Therefore, a testbed has been set up to measure matching
times and scalability of the filtering mechanisms proposed
and to validate its feasibility into large-scale NB-IoT change
deployments. Figure 8 shows a logical layout of the com-
ponents deployed in the physical computer used to execute
the experiments for performance evaluation. The testbed
machine has installed an Ubuntu 16.01 Xenial 64-bit oper-
ating system and is equipped with 32 GiB RAM, a 16 core
Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630 v4 @2.2GHz processor, and 2TB
optical hard disk plus a 500GB solid-state hard disk. Each of
the VMs employed for the deployment of vFirewall where the
experiments have been carried out has been deployed KVM
with 8Gb RAM, 2 vCores, and 40G HDD.
Firstly, the filtering agent receives an intent and uses
the user-space tool provided by Netfilter (iptables) to load
the filtering rules at two different points of the frame-
work NF IP PRE ROUTING and NF IP LOCAL IN, hook-
ing points 1 and 2, respectively (see A in Figure 8). Secondly,
an external process replays the PCAP file generated for this
experiment from the location indicated by label B in Figure 8.
When the first packet from the network interface matches
at hooking point 1 shown as label C shown in Figure 8, a
timestamp value is produced and such information is saved.
Finally, packets cross the hooking point 2 labeled as D in
Figure 8 where all the set of rules are already deployed (from
1 to 131072, depending on the scenario). Only the last rule
contains the filter predicate that perfectly matches the flow.
All the rules are homogeneous in complexity and all the
packets must be matched against all the rules. This approach
is a very pessimistic approach since it assumes always the
worst-case scenario. However, if scalability is proven for
this worst-case scenario, it will continue to be valid for less
extreme conditions. Once the first packet reaches the last
rule, it matches the predefined predicate and produces a new
timestamp. Therefore, the difference between timestamps
gathered at hooking point 2 and hooking point 1 provides
the time consumed of a packet crossing the kernel network
space when different rules have been applied. This allows us
tomeasure performance results related to the complexity and
the number of the predicates in the rule, and how it affects the
normal traffic of the network in terms of delay.
8. Performance Evaluation
This section evaluates the impact of dealing with complex
rules that requires deep inspection of the packets to support
nested encapsulation originated by multitenancy and mobil-
ity of 5G-enabled NB-IoT networks. The testbed estimates
the advisable maximum number of complex filtering rules
that can be enforced in one vFirewall without incurring
packet loss, taking into account the finest grained conditions
(i.e., one rule per NB-IoT device). In addition, it evaluates
the scalability and performance in terms of jitter, overhead
times, matching filtering rules times, and management times
(flushing and loading of rules).
To this end, for each of those evaluations, the paper
compares the performance of our traffic filtering mechanism
for NB-IoT 5G service-aware networks with the performance
achieved in traditional IP infrastructures, which can be han-
dled with traditional traffic filtering methods. Figure 9 shows
the four infrastructures previously presented in Section 7.3,
which will be analyzed along this section.
(1) Classical IP Infrastructure.
(2) User-awareMultitenant Infrastructure, where there is
tenant isolation and virtualization.
(3) 5G NB-IoT device mobility, multitenant infrastruc-
ture, where there is tenant isolation, virtualization and
device mobility.
14 Security and Communication Networks
NETWORK INTERFACE DRIVERS
User
Space
Kernel
Space
Local processes iptables
1 Route
NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING
2NF_IP_LOCAL_IN
3
NF_IP_FORWARD
4
NF_IP_POST_ROUTING
5
Route
NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT
Netlink
Netﬁlter
framework
C
B
A
Filtering
AgentIntent
D
Figure 8: Performance evaluation testbed.
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Figure 10: Average rule matching time per number of rules and analyzed infrastructure.
(4) NB-IoT Service-aware 5GMultitenant Infrastructure,
where there is tenant isolation, virtualization and
device mobility and NB-IoT service-level filtering
support.
Figure 10 represents the empirical results in terms of
performance times over analyzed infrastructures. The X-axis
follows an exponential function, increasing the number of
devices/rules in order to show how the proposed filtering
approach scales according to the number of devices. It is
noted that NB-IoT deployments should deal with thousands
of devices. This is why the largest scenario analyzed uses this
level of scalability to prove the feasibility of the proposed
approach at production-grade. The Y-axis is the average time
in milliseconds taken to process a packet that transverses all
the rules loaded.
The three series represent the three different tests pre-
viously indicated. The rules matching time grows according
to the increasing complexity of the infrastructures deployed
and the services provided by the infrastructure. This further
leads to more complex filtering rules that need to be applied.
Thus, the Classical IP Infrastructure provides the fastest
performance results while the NB-IoT Service-aware 5G
Multitenant Infrastructure provides the slowest.
As can be seen in the graph, the number of rules
deployed is the predominant and critical factor that affects
the scalability. In addition, the complexity of the supporting
infrastructure (scenario) also has an impact on time. For the
largest deployment with 32,768 devices, the time consumed
in a Classical IP Infrastructure scenario is around 20ms.
This case can be considered as the reference best scenario
as this is the simplest infrastructure. The other three scenar-
ios analyzed are User-aware Multitenant Infrastructure (or
simply referred to as Multitenant) and 5G NB-IoT device
mobility/multitenant infrastructure (NB-IoTMultitenant) as
well as 5GNB-IoTdevicemobility/multitenant infrastructure
(Service-aware NB-IoT Multitenant) exposing an increasing
overhead with respect to the classical IP scenario. Finally, the
complexity of the rules available in each of the scenarios for
each of the infrastructure seems to be a factor incurring less
delay.
In addition, the classical filtering method by using just IP
protocol inspection is around 37% for the 1-field test, 48% for
2-field test, and 69% for 3-fields faster than the Service-aware
NB-IoT Multitenant scenario and when thousands of rules
are applied in the vFirewall.
Moreover, the largest NB-IoT scenario with 32,768
rules/devices being filtered simultaneously requires 30ms for
16 Security and Communication Networks
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Figure 11: Performance of matching filtering rules using a logarithmic scale.
matching, which is clearly in the boundaries of the tolerable
delays indicated by the NB-IoT and LTE-M standards.
Figure 11 illustrates the same results plotted in Figure 10
yet in an exponential scale (log2 base, Y-axis) in terms of time
overhead and an exponential scale in the number of devices
(X-axis). Despite the exponential nature of both scales, the
plot shows a close to linear trend as the number of devices
grows, which validates the good scalability performance
of the proposed approach when scaling the number of
rules/devices.
After the above analysis of the behavior of all the different
rule complexities, a deeper analysis has been carried out by
stressing the infrastructure to gather results of the system
regarding scalability in terms of the number of simultaneous
devices performing a low-rate DDoS attack. To this end,
Figures 12, 13, and 14 focus on the most complex scenario
where all the headers’ fields are matched (3-field test). These
figures analyze the behavior of the system when 4,096, 8,192
and 16,384 devices are sending low-rate packets every 30s,
which simulates the behavior of a low-rate DDoS attack. It
leads to 137, 274, and 546 packets/s, respectively, as indicated
in the legend of these figures.
Figure 12 shows how the system is stable for the three
different number of devices analyzed until 4,096 rules where
the overhead time is close to seconds. Beyond that point, the
system is still stable for 8,196 rules for a scenario with 274 PPS
(Packets Per Second) (i.e., 8196 devices) for all infrastructures
analyzed, including NB-IoT 5G service-aware infrastructure
where the average overhead time is around 100ms. However,
the system becomes unstable when 8,196 rules are facing a
higher volume of attack, 546 PPS (i.e., 16384 devices). This
threshold determines the boundaries of the scalability in
terms of devices supported by a given virtual firewall.
Figure 13 shows an analysis of the packet loss and reas-
sures the previous results shown in Figure 12. There is no
packet loss for the three different number of devices analyzed
until 4,096 rules. Then, the system is still close to 0% packet
loss for 8,196 rules for a scenario with 274 PPS (i.e., 8196
devices). After this point, the number of lost packets starts to
increase dramatically, showing a similar behavior to the one
plotted in Figure 12. The Service-aware NB-IoT Multitenant
scenario with 16,384 devices (546 PPS) and 8,192 rules shows
an unacceptable packet loss rate of around 50%.
Figure 14 shows the behavior of the jitter when ranging
the number of devices and rules. Jitter is almost insignificant
and close to 0us, up to 4,096 rules. Then, it is still acceptable
for a scenario with 274 PPS (i.e., 8,196 devices) where the
jitter is around 100-300us, depending on the infrastructure
Security and Communication Networks 17
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Figure 12: Overhead time with respect to a 0-rule scenario according to both number of rules and infrastructure analyzed.
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Figure 13: Packet loss according to both number of rules and infrastructure analyzed.
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Figure 14: Jitter according to both number of rules and infrastructure analyzed.
analyzed. Beyond that number of devices, the jitter increases
significantly.
It can be concluded that the scalability boundaries of the
proposed architecture are set to 8,192 NB-IoT devices per
virtual firewall, where each of such devices has associated
a rule to control an NB-IoT service. Our testbed has the
capability to run eight VMs for 65,536 devices, which is far
beyond the expected 52.547 per cell indicated in the NB-IoT
standard [6]. This result successfully validates the suitability
of the proposed approach.
Figures 15 and 16 illustrate results on flushing and loading
times of rules, respectively, in order to analyze the manage-
ment plane of the proposed approach. From themanagement
plane’s perspective, flushing, and loading times gives critical
information about how long it takes for the management
system to reset the vFirewall when suddenly around up to
8,192 devices attack the system simultaneously. Cleaning the
last configuration and loading a completely new one would
take about 0.6ms and 6s, respectively. In other words, the
proposed system would be ready for controlling thousands
of completely different NB-IoT devices in 6s. It should be
noticed that these fine-grain rules are NB-IoT service-aware,
and it is worth clarifying that, by using a more generic rule
such as filtering by tenant or using amask in the IP addresses,
multiple flows could be stopped just by using one rule and all
the processes including flushing, loading, and matching will
be significantly reduced from the times specified above.
9. Conclusions
This paper has described a novel autonomic security frame-
work featuredwith an efficient network traffic filtering system
for virtualized and multitenant 5G-enabled NB-IoT net-
works, which relies on a cognitive management framework
for delivering autonomic self-protection capabilities to the
network.
Our proposed security framework and filtering system
are ready for mitigating an attack by deploying and loading
dynamically, thousands of filtering rules in the vFirewall,
corresponding to thousands of NB-IoT devices. The filtering
mechanism is able to process encapsulated 5G network traffic
in the core and in the edge of the virtualized 5G network
simultaneously, with multitenancy, mobility, and DPI sup-
port. The complex filtering rules, capable of handling such
traffic, are evaluated in the kernel space by our filtering agent
with minimal overhead in the vFirewall, which demonstrates
the feasibility and performance of the proposed security
framework and filtering system.
As future work, we plan to investigate mechanisms that
increase the intelligence of our management framework to
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Figure 15: Flushing times of cleaning NB-IoT Service-aware 5G Multitenant Infrastructure rules.
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Figure 16: Loading time of adding NB-IoT Service-aware 5G Multitenant Infrastructure rules.
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increase scalability and speed up, evenmore, the performance
of the traffic filtering mechanism.We also envisage extending
the security capabilities of the framework, by exploring the
autonomic deployment and management of other kinds of
virtual Network Security Functions, such as vAAA or vChan-
nelProtection, to cope with the challenging requirements of
IoT scenarios.
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